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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, changes in government policies, supply and demand 
fundamentals and price patterns in the cotton market have led to several shifts in how 
producers market their cotton.  This thesis examined producer cash marketing choices, 
including direct and indirect hedging, in four different periods since 2001.  Special 
emphasis was placed on the 2010 season—a season characterized by historically high 
prices and volatility.  Producer marketing behavior was modeled as a discrete choice 
between four different cash market outlets:  forward contracting with a merchant, post-
harvest cash contracting, contracting with a merchant pool and contracting with a 
cooperative pool.  Hedging was characterized as a tool that was used in conjunction with 
one of the four discrete choices.  This thesis employed multinomial logit estimation to 
determine the influence of factors on producers’ choice of primary cash marketing 
decisions.  Data were collected from a mail survey of the population of cotton growers in 
Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas.  The most important determinants of cotton cash 
marketing choices were 1) prior participation in cooperative pools, beliefs about the 
value of pre-harvest pricing, beliefs about the performance of merchant pools, 
willingness to accept lower prices to reduce risk, and several socio-economic variables. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Cotton production has supported local economies throughout the Southern 
United States for two hundred years.  Advances in bioengineering have led to the 
development of more pest-resistant and less water-intensive varieties that have allowed 
cotton to expand to cooler, drier climates, thus increasing the possible acreage devoted 
to cotton and domestic cotton production.  More recently, trade liberalization, growing 
population and industrialization of large Asian countries such as China, India and 
Pakistan have led to a rapidly increasing demand for textiles (Meyer et al 2007).   
Cotton is the fifth most produced field crop in the United States and the most 
prevalent row crop in Texas, which contains the most agricultural land of any U.S. state 
(NASS, 2007).  Yet, since many of the oldest land-grant universities and applied 
economics programs in the United States are in primarily corn-producing regions, 
cotton is historically understudied by agricultural economists.  Nevertheless, cotton is an 
important crop for several reasons:  
1. Cotton’s production and use lie on the forefront of global demographic transition 
of the Asian countries listed previously, as well as other growing economies 
such as Indonesia, and industrialized economies such as Egypt. 
2. The United States has significant political interests in many of the foreign 
countries heavily producing or milling cotton. 
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3. The United States’ cotton market has transitioned from a primarily domestic 
market to an export market beginning in the 1990s (See figure 1).  This shift has 
changed the landscape of marketing outlets.  Large cooperative pools now 
contract directly with mills worldwide which has served to expand cooperatives’ 
influence and opportunities.  Cotton prices have become more affected by 
exchange rates, which diversifies export markets and enables U.S. producers to 
not be dependent on a weak dollar and low interest rates for bullish prices.  
Additionally, globalization of the cotton market has led to an increase in 
volatility.  The U.S. cotton market must now incorporate information about 
supply and demand shifters (e.g. weather events, economic policy in foreign 
countries, etc.) on a global scale, rather than a national one.   
4. Cotton comprises a significant portion of commodity index funds, which have 
become popular among investors given the strength of commodities relative to 
equity markets since the recession of 2007-08 (Power and Robinson 2008). 
5. Cotton price patterns have undergone dramatic changes since the last cotton-
specific marketing studies were conducted. 
6. Changes in federal crop insurance programs, premiums and coverage levels have 
had a profound effect on cotton, the majority of which is produced in the 
Southwest, a region characterized by high yield variability. 
7. The cotton market exhibits characteristics that are somewhat unique among 
major commodities, such as the prevalence of large marketing pools and the 
trading of individual bales which can be traced back to a specific producer. 
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 Figure 1.  U.S. Domestic Mill Use and Exports Since 1985 
 
These factors necessitate two things this thesis hopes to accomplish:  (1) further 
extension of the agricultural economics literature on optimal hedging and producer 
marketing choices to cotton, and (2) an updating and expansion of recent previous 
studies on cotton marketing. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
 
The agricultural economics literature is replete with studies of marketing, 
insurance, and hedging.  These include both theoretical work, e.g., optimal hedge ratios, 
as well as empirical studies of the levels and determinants of either hedging or 
insurance.  These strands of literature have their parallels with research on technology 
adoption because of the influences of information, uncertainty, and socio-economic 
determinants.    
Adoption Studies 
Feder (1980) modeled producers’ willingness to adopt fertilizer as an innovation 
of production technology.  Adoption was viewed not as a discrete choice, but a choice 
of optimal allocation between traditional (non-fertilized) and modern (fertilized) acres 
among a producer’s total available land, subject to the constraint of available cash 
reserves.  Feder posited that, due to the uncertainty faced by producers considering 
adopting a new production technology, the overall yield risk caused by adoption 
increases as the relative share of land devoted to the modern mode of production 
increases. 
Wozniak (1984) applied principles of adoption literature to the decision of cattle 
producers to use feed additives.  Wozniak used a logit model to demonstrate that the 
probability of adoption of an innovation increases as uncertainty decreases.  Differences 
in uncertainty among producers faced with an adoption decision can be attributed to 
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differences in “human capital,” such as age, experience and education.  Stated another 
way, the most important fixed cost of adoption in Wozniak’s study was information.  
Producers with more information—which comes at a cost—about an innovation have a 
greater incentive to adopt.  Additionally, the probability of adoption increases with 
economies of size.  Larger operations have a greater opportunity cost of not adopting.  
Human capital has a diminishing effect on the probability of adoption, where size of 
operations has a more constant effect.  Size of operations can overtake education and 
experience as the driving factor of adoption at a particular value. 
Adoption Studies Employing Multinomial Logistic Regression 
 This paper will model the factors that influence several qualitative choices (cash 
marketing outlets) among cotton producers.  The objective of qualitative choice 
modeling is to determine each explanatory variable’s contribution to the marginal 
probability of adoption of one choice (dependent variable) over another.  When the 
dependent variable choices are non-ordinal, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression 
cannot be used (Pindyck and Rubenfeld 1991).  Instead, a Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator must be employed.  Maximum likelihood estimators express regression 
coefficients on a 0-1 interval.  The most basic MLE is the Linear Probability Model 
(LPM).  The dependent variable in LPM must be binary.  LPM is sufficient to use when 
the explanatory variable values (x’s) have a mostly linear relationship with the 
probability of adoption and are not clustered around the extreme low or high end of their 
respective distributions.  If observed x-values for any explanatory variable in a LPM are 
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skewed towards either tail of their distributions, LPM can yield coefficients less than 
zero or greater than one, which cannot be interpreted in terms of marginal probability. 
 The most basic LPM that fits values of y to a distribution is the Probit model.  
The Probit model is a binary model where the values of y are a function, G, of 
explanatory variables, 
                     (1) 
G is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF), 
                    
 
  
 (2) 
and ϕ(z) is the standard normal probability density function (Woolridge 2002): 
          
 
   
   
   (3) 
 Logistic regression is an extension of Probit that fits values of y directly to a 
strictly increasing logistic function in the form: 
      
  
       
 (4) 
This method is employed when the dependent variable can take on more than two non-
ordinal values, hence the name “Multinomial Logistic Regression.”  Its simplicity 
allows MLE to be performed for each possible value of y as the odds of being observed 
over each other possible value of y.  In the applied economics literature, MNL adoption 
studies refer to the values y can take on as choices of adoption of an “innovation.” An 
innovation can be defined as some proposed technique, concept or strategy that an agent 
deems as being “new” (Mercer, 2004).  Here, let J represent the number of alternative 
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choices in a model, j represent any particular choice, and k represent any choice among 
J other than j.  A general form of MNL estimation, then, is: 
        
   
        
 (5) 
Where: 
     
 
 
        
 
 
   (6) 
The arithmetic of Equation 5 allows J logarithmic odds ratios to be computed.  These 
ratios elicit the natural logarithm of the odds of a subject (observation), selected at 
random, choosing each j over each k (Isengildina and Hudson 2001a): 
   
   
   
                      (7) 
 Once the regression coefficients have been estimated with MLE, it is necessary 
to calculate the marginal effects on the probability of adoption of a one-unit change in 
each explanatory variable.  This is accomplished by taking the first-order derivative of 
the log-likelihood function with respect to Xi (Equation 7) and evaluating it at the means 
of the explanatory variables (Isengildina and Hudson 2001a): 
    
   
   
             
 
   
              (8) 
Where ϒj can be interpreted as the marginal probability that the “average” producer will 
adopt choice j over choice k. 
 Skaggs (2001) employed logistic regression to determine the factors leading to 
the adoption of drip irrigation systems for New Mexico chile producers.  They also 
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expanded their analysis to include the question of whether or not their respondents were 
likely to adopt in the near future.  As in Wozniak and Feder, age and farm size were 
shown to be significant in determining whether or not a producer was a “low-
technology” (traditional irrigation) or “high-technology” (sub-surface irrigation) 
irrigator.  Producers who maintained a significant operation in crops other than chiles 
were less likely to adopt high-tech irrigation, supporting the hypothesis that 
diversification of enterprises is a risk-reducing activity that can substitute for other risk-
management tools, in the same manner as off-farm income. 
 Amudavi et al (2008) used logistic regression to model Kenyan grain farmers’ 
propensity to adopt Push-pull Technology (PPT) to manage cereal stem-borers and an 
endemic weed species known as Striga as a result of field workshops.  Participation in 
the workshops was influenced by producers’ geographic region, education, soil fertility 
and intensity of pest infestation.  Regression results showed the probability of adoption 
increased significantly when a producer attended a workshop. 
Hedging Studies 
Adoption decisions can similarly apply to marketing and risk management.  For 
example, Shapiro and Brorsen (1987) used a survey of Indiana corn and soybean 
producers to estimate a system that captured both the probability of the discrete choice 
of whether or not to hedge, and the continuous level of hedging if hedging is adopted.  
Shapiro and Brorsen employed a tobit model on their data—gleaned from an in-person 
survey of 41 producers at a workshop—to characterize producer futures market use.  A 
censored regression model was necessary because several observations exhibited a level 
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of hedging of zero if the producer did not adopt hedging.  In addition to human capital 
and farm size, subjective risk assessment, producer self-characterization of management 
ability, leverage, income stability and perceptions of changes in income due to adoption 
were influential in producers’ decisions whether to hedge and at what..  The probability 
of adoption and level of hedging was directly related to leverage.  Interestingly, Shapiro 
and Brorsen found experience and formal education have an inverse relationship to the 
decision to hedge.  Possible reasons for the counterintuitive result were sampling bias 
inherent in the survey respondents and the idea that education fosters the ability to use 
other tools to reduce risk.     
Pennings and Leuthold (2000) elicited the probability of hedging depending on 
several producer attitude and perception variables.  Their study was distinguished from 
much of the adoption literature in that it disaggregated observations from the population 
of producers into segments.  Segments within the population were segregated by 
operation size and geographic region.  Pennings and Leuthold posited that unobservable 
latent variables can be accounted for in a model by pinning them to observable 
operator/operation characteristics through confirmatory factor analysis.  Their system 
simultaneously estimated links between latent variables and observations, and the 
relationships between the observable characteristics.  Testing for heterogeneity among 
the population, the authors found that disaggregating into two segments based on 
market-outlet choice (either selling to a cooperative or selling to a merchant) was 
statistically significant.  Among producers selling to cooperatives, risk attitude and risk 
perception were found to be the leading determinates of hedging behavior.  Among 
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producers selling to merchants, market orientation and the valuing of the ability to 
exercise entrepreneurial freedom were found to be the driving factors of hedging 
behavior.  As a possible explanation for a lack of relationship between education and 
actual hedging, Pennings and Leuthold found that the role of understanding the futures 
market was insignificant when their population was broken out into two segments.  All 
in all, cooperative producers were more apt to consider the financial structure of their 
farms and preserving their operation itself in deciding whether to hedge, and merchant-
affiliated producers were more apt to consider their ability to follow the markets and 
exercise “entrepreneurial freedom” in deciding whether to hedge. 
Lapan and Moschini (1994) improved upon traditional mean-variance derivation 
of the optimal hedge ratios with a system that takes into account agent risk-aversion.  
The mean-variance hedge in this study was taken to be the optimal hedge ratio absent of 
production risk.  The obvious presence of production risk in agriculture meant that the 
optimal hedge ratio faced by producers was actually less than that predicted by the 
mean-variance method.  Production risk was assumed to be jointly distributed 
(lognormal) with price risk and basis risk.  Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) 
coefficients were derived for representative soybean farms in Iowa (compiled at the 
county level), and retrofitted to the period from 1974-1990 in order to compute exact 
solutions for optimal hedge ratios.  Due to the amount of yield variability and the 
negative correlation between prices and yield in agricultural commodities, the study 
concluded that taking into account production risk as a random variable is imperative to 
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computing optimal hedge ratios.  It was also asserted that the model using CARA 
functions was useful when different distributions and utility functions were assumed. 
Coble (2000) used representative farms to compute optimal hedge ratios given 
stochastic yield, price and basis risk.  Yield was assumed to be normally distributed and 
expected future cash price was presumed to be log-normally distributed.  They initially 
found that producers’ optimal hedge ratios decreased as yield risk increased. This was 
consistent with the idea that greater uncertainty of yield leads the producer to have a 
larger exposed hedge position, thus reducing the demand for hedging.  Coble also found 
that the optimal hedge ratio was inversely related to price-yield correlation.  This is due 
to the fact that yield-price correlation provides a “natural hedge,” reducing the demand 
for hedging.  Coble then applied four insurance designs to each of the four farms in the 
model:  (1) MPCI, (2) MVP, (3) RI and (4) CRC.  Generally, there was no effect on the 
optimal hedge ratios for coverage levels below the minimum requirements for 
commodity program participation.  It was found that yield insurance designs are 
complementary to the demand for hedging.  MVP led to a slightly higher hedge ratio 
than MPCI.  The revenue insurance products had different effects.  RI was shown to 
have a non-linear relationship with the optimal hedge ratio.  RI was complementary to 
hedge ratios in lower- to mid-level levels of coverage, and exhibited a substitution effect 
at higher coverage levels.  CRC was found to be more complementary to hedging since 
its upside price component is analogous to a call option.  CRC was found to be 
substitutionary to put options since a put option payoff is inversely related to price. 
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Riley and Anderson (2009a) compared the cost of hedging with other variable 
input costs.  Commodity Costs and Returns Data from the USDA-ERS were compared 
with historical futures and cash contract prices for corn, soybeans, cotton and wheat.  
An unhedged position was used as the baseline scenario, with three hedging strategies 
compared:  (1) a 100% hedge prior to planting, (2) a 1/3 hedge at planting time and (3) a 
1/3 hedge half way through the season.  It was determined that the cost of hedging 
related to other variable costs had increased slightly for corn and soybeans.  This is due 
to the fact that both corn and soybeans have emerged as a renewable fuel source, which 
has increased volatility in these markets, hence, option premiums and margin calls have 
increased.  Cotton and wheat hedging costs (as of 2009) had not significantly changed 
relative to the increase in other variable input costs. 
Marketing Studies 
Non-cotton and General Commodity Marketing Studies 
Brorsen and Anderson (2001) applied the concept of behavioral finance to 
producer marketing choices.  They deduced from previous studies that markets are only 
inefficient for brief periods of time, therefore, producers should view markets as 
efficient when selecting a marketing strategy.  Behavioral finance offers some 
explanations of why producers make biased marketing decisions.  Five types of bias-
inducing behaviors were identified: (1) Anchoring, (2) Myopic Loss Aversion and 
Regret, (3) Fallacy of Small Numbers, (4) Overconfidence and (5) Hindsight Bias.  The 
authors stated that the best way for producers to prevent mistakes is to use the same 
marketing strategy year after year; therefore, extension education programs should be 
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focused on reinforcing the efficient market hypothesis and encouraging producers to 
remain disciplined in their marketing strategies. 
Brorsen and Anderson (2005) tested the hypothesis that “most farmers receive a 
below-average price for their crop,” a statement that is often mentioned in some form in 
the popular press.  Daily prices paid data were collected from three Oklahoma wheat 
elevators.  Behavioral finance theory states that producers will exhibit patterns based on 
psychological responses to events.  Granger causality was used to determine if there was 
a consistent pattern of wheat producers selling in the bottom third of the market, relative 
to seasonal average prices.  It was determined that a majority of wheat producers do not 
sell in the bottom one-third of the market.  There was some evidence, however, that 
producers wait beyond the end of the calendar year for higher prices, which is not a 
reasonable expectation. 
Riley and Anderson (2009b) compared the subjective probabilities of corn, 
cotton and soybean growers’ price expectations with implied volatility using the Black-
Scholes Model.  They found that producers tend to significantly underestimate volatility 
and expect significantly higher contract settlement prices. 
Cotton Marketing Studies 
Although relatively understudied, cotton has seen some similar research of risk 
management choices.  This includes analysis of optimal hedge ratios by Berck (1981) 
and Coble et al (2000). The two main empirical efforts date from the post-1996 farm bill 
era of price volatility.  Isengildina and Hudson  used logit analysis (2001a)  and a 
systems approach (2001b) to analyze grower survey data measuring the primary choice 
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of marketing outlet:  (1) cash sales, (2) forward pricing (either through pools or 
merchants) and (3) direct hedging through the futures market.  As with previous 
adoption and marketing studies, independent variables in the model were divided into 
operator and farm characteristics, use of other available risk management tools and non-
economic variables.  Operator and farm characteristics included farm size, education, 
market-specific training and age.  Other risk management tools included crop insurance, 
government payments and off-farm income.  Non-economic variables included attitude 
questions that captured producers’ posture towards direct hedging, and evaluation of 
their own marketing performance versus that of pools. 
Isengildina and Hudson showed that the probability of choosing forward pricing 
over cash sales increased with farm size and decreases with off-farm income and 
income from government payments.  The attitude that pool usage can net producers a 
higher price than they could net marketing on their own was directly related to indirect 
hedging.  Producers who purchased coverage levels above the government-mandated 
minimum were 11 percent more likely to choose cash sales as a marketing outlet.  
Predictably, risk aversion was found to be directly related with direct hedging, which 
confirmed the idea that growers view forward pricing as a risk-reduction tool.  Financial 
leverage was not statistically significant in predicting choice of marketing outlet. 
Vergara et al (2004) implemented a mail survey of Mississippi and Texas cotton 
growers to elicit data and test hypotheses similar to those of Isengildina and Hudson.  
Vergara et al classified “forward pricing” as either with a merchant or with a pool.  
Thus, marketing outlet choices included cash sales, merchant forward contracting, pool 
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contracting and futures market contracting (i.e., direct hedging).  In addition to typical 
instrumental variables (examples:  insurance choices, formal education, farm size), 
producer perceptions of yield and price variability were included.  They hypothesized 
that yield and price variability were important in eliciting producers’ risk aversion 
because of these factors’ influence on the optimal hedge ratio (as distinguished from the 
minimum-variance hedge ratio).  Producer knowledge level of marketing outlets and 
money spent on market advisory services was included.  Other producer perceptions 
such as orientation to marketing strategies in terms of returns and perception of market 
efficiency were included.  Interestingly, price and yield variability were not statistically 
significant in the model.  Size of operation was directly related to pool pricing and 
inversely related to cash sales.  Producers more willing to accept a lower price (less 
risk-averse for returns to marketing) were less likely to adopt pool pricing.  Money 
spent on market advisory services was directly related to forward pricing, pool pricing 
and futures pricing.  Age was inversely related to futures market usage because, 
according to the authors, the opportunity cost of education about the futures market 
increases with age.  Crop insurance purchase was directly related to futures pricing and 
forward pricing, which confirmed prior theoretical predictions that forward pricing is 
complementary to crop insurance coverage (Coble et al 2000).  
Since the Isengildina and Vergara studies, the U.S. cotton market has 
experienced restructuring from globalization, the influence of ethanol and competing 
crops, and the alleged financialization of agricultural markets.  Although this last 
influence is not supported by available research (Power and Robinson 2008; Janzen et al 
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2012), the last five years have seen several periods of historically high and volatile 
prices (Carter and Janzen 2009).  The anecdotal result of high cotton prices is grower 
shifting back and forth among traditional outlets like cooperative pools or merchant 
contracts.  In addition, the last decade has seen cotton merchants begin organizing and 
managing their own marketing pools in competition with the large cooperatives.   
The aforementioned changes in the cotton market suggest the need for an 
updated picture of cotton marketing decision making.  This paper represents an 
econometric analysis of a recent survey effort of growers in the southwestern region, 
i.e., Kansas, Oklahoma, and primarily Texas. 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
As with the previous empirical studies of cotton, this research involved a survey 
of cotton growers to obtain current information about cotton marketing outlet choices.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that roughly half of Texas growers market their cotton 
through cooperative seasonal pools, with the balance sold through merchant contracts 
(both forward and spot) and merchant controlled pools.  Another goal of the survey 
process was to obtain selling price performance data for the 2010 cotton crop, as well as 
respondent socio-economic and demographic information. 
Survey Instrument Development 
Elements of the survey instruments used by previous researchers (Isengildina 
and Hudson 2001; Vergara et al 2004) were adapted to the present task to include newer 
marketing outlets (i.e., merchant pools), current crop and revenue insurance products, 
and current issues.  The survey solicited the percentage shares of 2010 cotton 
production that were allocated among four different marketing outlets. Many of the 
same risk management attitude and belief questions used by previous research were 
applied in 5-point Likert scale format.  Following development and IRB approval of the 
survey instrument, the survey was implemented as a two round mailing with a postcard 
reminder.  Surveys were mailed to the current listing of the Cotton Board mailing list for 
Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.  The Cotton Board is a quasi-government organization 
charged by USDA for “…the oversight and administrative arm of the Cotton Research 
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& Promotion Program, representing U.S. Upland cotton…  To fund the Program, the 
Cotton Board collects a per-bale assessment of all Upland cotton harvested and ginned 
in the U.S., as well as an importer assessment for all Upland cotton products imported 
into the U.S.  (Cotton Board 2012).”  In essence, this mailing list represented the whole 
population sample of those in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas who sold cotton in 2010-
11.   
For the first survey implementation, 6,627 questionnaires were mailed out on 
March 1, 2012, with a reminder postcard sent to the entire population ten days later.  
The second mailing to non-respondents was April 15, 2012.  The two weeks between the 
initial mailing and the postcard reminder, and the four weeks between the postcard 
reminder and the second mailing, was inspired by Dillman.  Dillman recommended the 
second mailing follow the postcard reminder by fifteen business days (Dillman 1978).  I 
opted to wait an additional week to ensure that as many of the first survey respondents 
as possible could be removed from the second mailing list.  Of the total mailings, 100 
were returned to sender as undeliverable.  A total of 314 surveys were returned, of 
which 51 had unusable/incomplete responses.  Figure 2 is a map of Texas counties 
represented in the survey. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 This includes all cotton farmers who sold upland cotton as well as landlords with share rent contracts.  
Share rent landlords vary in their marketing involvement, hence this likely contributed to non-response to 
the marketing survey questionnaire.  
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 Figure 2.  Texas Counties Represented in Survey 
 
Data Development 
The survey elicited shares of cotton sold through various cash marketing outlets 
in various time periods.  The four cash marketing outlet choices were (1) forward 
contracts with a merchant, (2) post-harvest spot contracts with a merchant, (3) contracts 
with a merchant pool and (4) contracts with a cooperative pool.  Survey respondents 
were also given the option of a fifth marketing outlet choice, denoted as “other,” which 
they were then asked to describe.  Since most of the respondents who marketed a 
majority of their cotton through the “other” outlet described their choice as selling on 
the post-harvest open cash market, these responses were collapsed into the “post-harvest 
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spot contract with a merchant” category, reducing the model to four dependent 
variables.  In order to perform the logit analysis, each respondent’s highest reported 
share of marketing outlet was designated as their primary choice.  Their primary choice 
of outlet was recorded, with the cooperative pool outlet being designated as the base 
value.  This was possible because most respondents indicated a clear percentage-wise 
primary choice.  The eight observations with an even allocation among two or more 
marketing outlets were excluded from the analysis, leaving 263 usable responses.   Of 
these, twelve were from Oklahoma or Kansas, which matches the roughly 94% Texas 
share of cotton production in the three state region (NASS 2007). 
List of Dependent Variables and Abbreviations: 
1) FORWARD  Direct forward contract with a merchant 
2) CASH   Post-harvest spot contract with a merchant 
3) MPOOL  Contract with a merchant pool 
4) COOP   Contract with a cooperative pool  
The four time periods represented in the survey were (1) 2001-2006, (2) 2007-
2009, (3) 2010 and (4) 2011.  The cotton market in each of these time periods is thought 
to exhibit different price behavior.  The 2001-2006 period was marked by relatively low 
prices with the exception of the price spike of late 2003 and early 2004 (Robinson 
2012).  Weaker foreign demand and the relative strength of the U.S. Dollar may have 
been factors.  The 2007-2009 period was characterized by dramatic price increases in 
cotton, followed by a sharp decline that was coincident with global recession (Power 
and Robinson 2008).  The increase in prices and volatility during this time may be 
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attributed to soaring global demand in emerging countries such as China and India and 
an overall increase in commodity prices due to increased demand for biofuels.  Figure 3 
outlays the recent price history of cotton leading up to the survey. 
 
Figure 3.  Nearby Futures in Cents/Lb Since July 2001 
 
2010 primary choices were used as the dependent variable in this paper because 
of the historic increase in price and volatility.  Since cotton producers might exhibit 
behavioral finance patterns such as “hindsight bias” and “myopic loss aversion and 
regret,” it is likely the events of 2010 could have induced the most pronounced 
reordering of marketing preferences (Brorsen and Anderson 2001).  Respondents’ open-
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ended comments, as provided for at the end of the survey, indicated many producers 
were suspicious of contract non-delivery fraud on the part of some of their peers.  These 
comments bolster anecdotal evidence that marketing preferences were being reexamined 
even prior to the ending of the 2010 harvest.              
While only shares allocated in the 2010 season were used as the dependent 
variable in the logit analysis, a consistent primary choice of cooperative marketing in 
both the 2001-2006 and 2007-2009 time periods was developed into a 0/1 independent 
variable indicating a history of cooperative participation.  This was accomplished by 
determining the primary choice for each respondent in each of time periods 1 and 2.  If 
the primary marketing choice in both time periods for the i
th
 respondent was cooperative 
pool, the variable CHIST (coop history) was assigned a value of 1; 0 if otherwise.  
CHIST was hypothesized to be negatively related to the likelihood of choosing any 
other marketing outlet over cooperative pools. 
Marketing choices in 2011 were elicited in the survey to help bolster evidence of 
shifting preferences as a result of the 2010 price spike.  This proved to be unhelpful due 
to widespread abandonment caused by the 2011 Texas drought.  For 2010 and 2011 
marketing shares, respondents were given options to report their “intended” shares (if no 
crop was harvested), “expected” shares (if a crop was harvested, or expected to be 
harvested, and had not been contracted yet), or “actual” shares (if a crop had been 
harvested and already contracted).  It was hoped giving the respondents the opportunity 
to report “intended” shares for 2011 would elicit the marketing choices for producers 
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who abandoned crops, but most respondents did not utilize this reporting option.  Thus, 
2011 marketing choices are included in the summary statistics for description only.   
Development of Explanatory Variables 
 Factors believed to influence marketing decisions can be divided into three 
groups:  (1) operator and operation characteristics, (2) risk attitude and perception 
variables and (3) usage of alternative risk management strategies.  See table 1 below for 
a list of all independent variable names and abbreviations that will be used heretofore. 
 
Table 1.  List of Independent Variables and Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Description Type 
CHIST History of cooperative marketing 0/1 indicator variable 
CDIV Influence of cooperative pool 
dividends on participation 
5-point Likert scale 
HEDGED Incidence of hedging 0/1 indicator variable 
MPCI Participation in MPCI program 0/1 indicator variable 
RI Participation in RA or CRC 
programs 
0/1 indicator variable 
PHPBLF Effectiveness of pre-harvest 
marketing strategies 
5-point Likert scale 
WILLING Willingness to settle for a lower 
price to reduce risk 
5-point Likert scale 
AVGPR Agreement with statement “Co-
op seasonal pools tend to give an 
average price.” 
5-point Likert scale 
MPBLF Agreement with statement 
“Merchant pools will probably 
get a higher price than co-op 
pools.” 
5-point Likert scale 
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Table 1 (Continued).   
PRRISK Potential for crop price 
variability to affect farm income 
5-point Likert scale 
ATTITUDE Producer self-characterization of 
risk-aversion relative to other 
farmers 
5-point Likert scale 
OFFINC Off-farm income Continuous—percentage 
ASSETS Total assets in operation Categorical 
LEVERAGE Percentage of borrowed assets Continuous—percentage  
EDUC Respondent highest completed 
formal education level 
Categorical 
ACRES Size of operation in acres Continuous 
IRR Percentage of operation irrigated Continuous—percentage  
 
Operator and Operation Characteristics 
 Operator characteristics measured in this study are years of formal education and 
age.  Operation characteristics include net worth (assets), size of operation (in acres), 
percentage of operation that is irrigated, and leverage.  Net worth was elicited by asking 
the respondent to characterize the dollar amount of assets in their operation by one of 
six discrete categories.  Size of operation was included in the analysis because of several 
previous studies that indicated size of operations reduces the risk and cost of 
information of seeking alternative marketing strategies (Wozniak 1984).  Irrigated acres 
were measured because irrigation reduces yield risk and thus provides for a wider range 
of marketing alternatives available to the producer such as direct bale forward contracts 
with merchants.  Theoretically, there would be a direct relationship between the 
likelihood of adoption of FORWARD or MPOOL over COOP and irrigated acres.  
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Leverage is historically considered to increase the overall risk in an investment (Collins 
1985) and has been studied extensively in agriculture.  Isengildina and Hudson (2001a) 
did not find leverage to be statistically significant in their study, but it was included in 
this analysis because of the historical precedent.  Leverage was elicited in the survey by 
asking the producer to record the percentage of his/her assets in the operation that were 
borrowed. 
 The statement “Co-op marketing dividends and/or revolvement of past book 
credits, retains, etc., are very influential in my decision to participate in cooperative 
seasonal pools,” was scored on a 5-point Likert scale, with “1” indicating strong 
disagreement and “5” indicating strong agreement.  This question was included to 
measure the contribution of attitude towards cooperative pool dividends to the 
probability of adopting cooperative pooling over other alternatives.  It was hypothesized 
that respondents indicating agreement with this statement would be more likely to 
contract with cooperatives; however, the possibility exists that producers view dividends 
as a “bonus” rather than a tool to maximize returns to marketing. 
Risk Attitude and Risk Perception Variables 
 There is an extensive history in economics literature of using five-point Likert 
scale questions to elicit risk attitudes, risk perception, and the comfort level of usage of 
certain risk management tools (Pennings and Leuthold 2000; Isengildina and Hudson 
2001; Vergara et al 2004; Franken et al 2008).  This paper has employed similar 
techniques for survey questions of cotton producers. 
26 
 
 In the first group of risk attitude questions, respondents were asked to rate their 
level of agreement (on a five-point scale with “1” indicating strong disagreement, “3” 
indicated indifference and “5” indicating strong agreement) with various statements 
regarding risk management tools.  The four risk management tool questions assessed for 
this paper are as follows: 
1) “Pre-harvest marketing strategies will, on average, result in a higher price than 
selling at harvest.” 
2) “I am willing to take a lower price to reduce price risk.” 
3) “Co-op seasonal pools tend to give an average price.” 
4) “Merchant pools will probably get a higher price than co-op pools.” 
The first statement, “Pre-harvest marketing strategies will, on average, result in a 
higher price than selling at harvest,” is typically thought to be directly related to the 
likelihood of both direct and indirect hedging, as was the case in Isengildina and 
Hudson (2001a) and Vergara and Coble (2004).  Isengildina and Hudson viewed 
forward contracting with a merchant as a form of indirect hedging.  Thus, this question 
was included in the analysis.  Another alternative hypothesis for this question was that 
agreement with the effectiveness of pre-harvest pricing would be inversely related to the 
likelihood of adopting post-harvest cash marketing over cooperative marketing. 
The second statement, “I am willing to take a lower price to reduce price risk,” was 
included in the analysis to measure the relationship between a respondent’s willingness 
to “settle” for an average price and their likelihood of adopting cash marketing or direct 
forward contracting over cooperative pools.  The theoretical objective of pooling is to 
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sell equal parts of the pooled commodity in regular intervals throughout the year to 
obtain an annual average price (Vergara et al 2004).  Intuitively, this is a risk-reducing 
activity that requires a producer to forego an opportunity to earn higher returns to 
marketing by selling on his/her own.   
The third statement, “Co-op seasonal pools tend to give an average price,” 
measures the respondent’s belief that cooperative pools actually do pay out average 
prices.  This question was included in the analysis because anecdotal evidence suggests 
some skepticism on the part of producers that cooperative pools operate according to the 
premise of average pricing, as discussed in the previous paragraph.  In addition, growers 
who prefer merchant marketing channels might agree with this statement as an 
acknowledgement of what they believe is the main disadvantage of co-op performance. 
The fourth statement, “Merchant pools will probably get a higher price than co-
op pools,” was included in the analysis to measure if the recent emergence of merchant 
pools as players in cotton marketing has been brought about by a change in producer 
attitudes, or if merchant pools have been successful in developing the perception that 
they pay better than cooperative pools.  Clearly, one would expect agreement with this 
statement to be directly related to the probability of adopting merchant pools over 
cooperative pools. 
A question was included asking respondents to rank the potential for a risk 
source to effect farm income, on a five-point scale with “1” indicating a low potential to 
effect farm income, and “5” indicating a high potential to effect farm income.  The risk 
source measured here is “crop price variability.”  Crop yield variability was omitted 
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from the analysis because it was not a statistically significant predictor of hedging 
decisions in Vergara et al (2004) and, moreover, producer perceptions of yield 
variability are reflected in insurance choices.  Crop price variability was included in this 
analysis to measure the degree to which producer perceptions of price variability cause 
producers to market more or less cautiously.  Different possible relationships between 
PRRISK and marketing might exist.  On the one hand, producers who view price risk as 
the main source of revenue risk might be inclined to adopt cooperative marketing, 
assuming they view the objective of coops is to pay an average price (as in the variable 
CPBLF).  On the other hand, producers with a high level of agreement on PRRISK 
might prefer to lock in a forward price by contracting directly with a merchant.  The 
latter case is intuitive because producers who view yield risk to be a greater source of 
revenue risk than price risk would be inclined to not contract with a merchant because 
of the possibility of non-delivery due to abandonment or low yield.  This study adopted 
the latter hypothesis:  that the sign on CPBLF for MPOOL and FORWARD is positive.   
Finally, in keeping with precedent from previous literature, producers’ self-
characterization of risk-aversion in relation to other producers was measured on a five-
point scale, with “1” indicating the respondent is much less willing to accept risk than 
their peers, and “5” indicating the respondent is much more willing to accept risk than 
their peers.  It was hypothesized that producers more willing to accept risk than their 
peers would be more likely to “market on their own,” or, in other words, choose cash 
marketing or direct forward contracting over cooperative pooling.  This is due to a 
commonly expressed belief among producers that the purpose of pool marketing is to 
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“outsource” marketing decisions, which is supported in the open-ended respondent 
comments in the survey. 
Other Risk-Reducing Activities 
 Risk-reducing activities by producers other than marketing methods include crop 
insurance, participating in government commodity programs, maintaining cash and 
credit reserves, off-farm income, and hedging with futures and options.  Two different 
types of crop insurance coverage, off-farm income and instance of hedging were 
included in the analysis for this paper. 
 Crop insurance coverage can typically be grouped into two types:  yield 
insurance and revenue insurance.  The program names and coverage levels have 
changed considerably over the years.  Since the econometric model for this paper was 
based on 2010 data, Multiple Peril Crop Insurance was used as the standard yield 
insurance product.  Revenue coverage could be purchased in 2010 under two different 
program types:  Revenue Assurance (RA) and Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC).  RA and 
CRC both insure a percentage of gross revenue and trigger indemnity payments if gross 
revenue falls below the coverage level.  The key difference between CRC and RA is 
that CRC revalues gross revenue at harvest time if the harvest cash price is higher than 
the futures price at planting.  Thus, RA is analogous to having a combination of yield 
insurance and a put option.  CRC is analogous to having yield insurance, a put option 
and a call option.  CRC AND RA can both be substitutionary for forward pricing in the 
presence of yield risk and low harvest time price expectations.  Alternatively, they can 
both complement forward pricing at higher harvest time price expectations.  Since CRC 
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and RA have similar relationships to forward pricing in terms of price and yield 
expectations, they were collapsed into a single 0/1 indicator variable for this thesis.  
Yield insurance was hypothesized to be directly related to the probability of choosing 
direct forward contracting over cooperative pooling, since it was assumed that contract 
non-delivery due to abandonment or low yield is the largest risk faced by producers who 
have direct bales contracts with merchants.      
Off-farm income was included in the regression (OFFINC).  Off-farm income 
generates cash reserves from other sources that can be used to offset losses to farm 
income due to yield loss or adverse price movement.  Essentially, off-farm income can 
be used for self-insurnace.  Thus, off-farm income is viewed as a risk-reducing activity 
outside of marketing alternatives and can substitute for forward pricing of some kind.      
Respondents were asked to indicate the percentage of their 2010 crop that was hedged 
using futures and options, broken down into two categories:  (1) matched (cotton 
hedged that was also contracted with a pool or merchant) and (2) unmatched (expected 
or actual production that was hedged using futures and/or options and was not 
contracted through another marketing outlet as in (1)).  The variable was developed into 
a dummy variable with any instance of hedging on the part of a respondent set equal to 
1; 0 if otherwise.  Producer hedging behavior is studied frequently over the last twenty 
years and has been considered both complimentary and substitutionary to various types 
of marketing choices and risk management activities.  Isengildina and Hudson (2001a) 
collapsed futures hedging with forward contracting (which they deemed a form of 
“indirect hedging”) into a single dependent variable in their model, viewing the decision 
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to hedge as a marketing outlet in and of itself.  This thesis sought to treat futures 
hedging separate from forward contracting because of the ability to hedge an open 
commodity, a strategy that typically consists of options contracts, which have only fixed 
transaction costs upfront and no margin calls.  More importantly, this thesis included 
futures hedging on the right-hand side of the econometric model since it can function as 
an alternative risk management strategy, in the same manner as government commodity 
programs and insurance. 
Model Specification 
 In following Vergara et al (2004), a simple model depicting the i
th
 producer’s 
discrete choice of adoption of the j
th
 marketing outlet is as follows: 
                  (9) 
Where Xi is the set of explanatory variables defined in the previous section, β is a vector 
of parameters and εi is a normally distributed error term with a mean of zero.  Using the 
Multinomial Logit estimation procedure discussed in Chapter 2, with cooperative pool 
marketing (COOP) designated as the base value (intercept) in the regression 
specification, the log-likelihood ratios are designated as follows: 
        
          
       
  (10) 
        
       
       
  (11) 
        
       
       
  (12) 
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The regression coefficients are listed in Appendix B and can be interpreted as the 
vectors of (βj – βk) from Equation 7 for each Γij.  Also listed in Appendix B are the 
marginal effects on the probability of adoption of each marketing choice for each 
independent variable at its mean, as described in Equation 8. 
 Stata was used for the regression estimation and diagnostics.  Survey data were 
initially recorded in Excel.  After data entry and development, the dataset was imported 
into Stata for N = 263 observations.  The Multinomial Logistic Regression command 
“mlogit” was executed for the independent variables listed in table 1 with the four 
marketing choices as dependent variables.  The dependent variables were assigned 
numbers in the dataset (1 = FORWARD, 2 = CASH, 3 = MPOOL and 4 = COOP), and 
choice number 4 (COOP) was designated as the base value.  Stata automatically drops 
collinear variables in Multinomial Logistic Regression unless the option “Keep 
Collinear Variables” is checked.  Stata was not commanded to keep collinear variables 
and no variables were dropped as collinear.  The variance-covariance matrix of 
independent variables was ran for diagnostics using the “correlate” command.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
Diagnostics 
 As previously mentioned, no independent variables were dropped from the 
model in Stata due to collinearity.  This is supported by reviewing the 
variance/covariance matrix (See appendix C).  The largest correlation coefficient in 
absolute value is on RI, MPCI (-.4429).  This is an expected result due to the presumed 
substitutionary relationship between revenue and yield insurance.  Since it’s reasonable 
for a producer with certain characteristics (e.g., mixture between irrigated and non-
irrigated land or use of partial option hedges) to use revenue and yield insurance 
products jointly, both variables were kept in the analysis.  One other noteworthy 
correlation coefficient was on ACRES, IRR (.4269).  It is not intuitive to believe that 
percent of acreage irrigated would increase with farm size, since larger farms exhibit 
economies of scale and thus diffuse production risk more than small farms, thus the 
relationship between these two variables was assumed random.  Predictably, ASSETS, 
ACRES (.3889) exhibited some correlation, but both variables were included in the 
analysis to allow for the possibility that smaller operations with strong cash positions 
can own more expensive production technology such as pickers or high-yield irrigation 
systems.  AGE, LEVERAGE showed a predictable negative relationship (-.353).  It is 
reasonable to believe younger producers have younger tenures of operation and are 
therefore more likely to be in repayment of land and capital expenditure loans than older 
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producers.  CDIV, CHIST were directly related.  Common sense supports that producers 
reporting a history of cooperative marketing would view cooperative dividends as 
influential in their choice of marketing outlet.  Both variables were included because it 
was discovered that, among producers who reported cooperative pooling as their 
primary marketing choice, a significant portion of them reported being “indifferent” 
towards the influence of dividends in their choosing of cooperatives.  The average score 
for the question “Co-op marketing dividends and/or revolvement of past book credits, 
retains, etc., are very influential in my decision to participate in cooperative seasonal 
pools,” among cooperative pool participants was 3.59 with a standard deviation of 1.11.  
Since the dependent variable values in multinomial logistic regression are already fitted 
to a distribution, heteroskedasticity is not a concern.  There was a relationship between 
the question “Co-op seasonal pools tend to give an average price,” and the variables 
CDIV (.3058) and CHIST (.3012).  This is an interesting observation in that it indicates 
there is at least some perception among legacy cooperative pool participants that 
seasonal pools actually do pay an average price. 
A geographic dummy variable, GEOG, indicating whether or not a respondent 
was from a region in Texas (Gaines and Dawson counties) known for marketing and 
ginning independently, was dropped from the analysis.  The standard error for GEOG 
on CASH was too large to warrant meaningful analysis.  The anomaly was likely due to 
not enough responses in the Gaines/Dawson county area.  CHIST also had a relatively 
large standard error for CASH (1020.76) and MPOOL (1281.83), but was kept in the 
35 
 
analysis because of the statistically significant and intuitive result on FORWARD, 
which will be discussed in the section on regression results.       
Summary Statistics 
Appendix A provides a listing of key variable names, descriptions, and summary 
statistics of variables used in the subsequent regression analysis.  Of the four primary 
market outlet choices in 2010, 64% of respondents primarily sold through seasonal 
cooperative pools, while 16%, 11%, and 7% primarily sold through merchant forward 
contracting, merchant spot contracts after harvest, or merchant pools, respectively.  That 
such a large share of the crop was committed early in the 2010 growing season is not 
surprising given the relatively good price level during the first half of 2010.  As it turned 
out, the 11% of growers who sold after harvest probably received the higher prices 
given the unexpected and unprecedented price rally in late 2010. 
The mean of the CHIST variable indicates that 55% of the respondents had a 
history of selling through the cooperative seasonal pool.  This fits anecdotal evidence of 
half of Texas growers marketing this way.  It also conforms to the slightly above neutral 
rating of CDIV, the statement that cooperative dividends and book credits are an 
incentive to pool participation.  On average, the respondents were slightly more inclined 
to agree that pre-harvest pricing results in a higher price, and slightly less inclined to 
agree that merchant pools tend to give higher prices than cooperative pools.  These 
results could reflect slightly more pool supporters/believers in the data set.  However, 
there is the possibility of lingering negative bias on the part of 2010 merchant pool 
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participants
2
.  Similarly, the above neutral agreement with cooperative pools giving an 
average price could reflect a mixture of pool supporters (who accept getting an average 
price) and those who prefer alternatives to the cooperative pool. 
Risk attitudes were slightly above neutral for the relevant variables WILLING 
(i.e., to accept lower prices for less risk) and ATTITUDE (self-assessment of 
willingness to accept risk relative to other growers).  Price risk, PRRISK, was seen as 
fairly influential in overall net revenue risk with a mean of 4.338 on a 1 to 5 scale. 
Only 5.7% of the respondents indicated any level of hedging with futures or 
options for the 2010 crop.  This low level of hedging conforms with prior research 
studies.  
Given the survey response rate, some discussion about how well the data 
represent the population of cotton growers in the region using the summary statistics.  
According the 2007 Census of Agriculture, the average size of a cotton farm in Texas is 
647 acres.  The mean of ACRES in this study was 1,032.  Such a result is indicative of 
possible sampling bias.  Yet, if the theories on the cost of information about marketing 
as discussed in Chapter 2 are true, it stands to reason that larger operations may have 
more information about their marketing practices at their disposal and thus be more 
inclined to participate in a survey.  Larger operations may also exhibit more diversity in 
marketing choices to diffuse risk, which may lead to a respondent being more likely to 
participate in a survey about marketing than a respondent who views a marketing outlet 
                                                          
2
 It is essential to point out, however, that negative bias towards seasonal pooling or any kind of 
preharvest pricing could have affected the results of many variables in this survey, given the price 
movements in late 2010/early 2011.  This effect may not be unique to attitude questions regarding 
pooling. 
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as a means to reduce time spent on marketing activities.  This discrepancy is supported 
in Vergara et al (2004) where the mean farm size was 1,002 acres.   
The percentage of reported acres that were irrigated from the survey was roughly 
32%, which is sufficiently close to the 2007 figure of 34%.  The average survey 
respondent age in the study was 57.8, which conforms to the 58.9 average age of 
principal farm operator from the 2007 Census of Agriculture.  Producers’ former 
education level was not elicited in the 2007 census, but the mean of EDUC in this study 
was 2.4 which was very close to Isengildina and Hudson’s (2001) result of 2.71 (both 
indicated the average respondent had slightly more than a high school education).  The 
mean percentage of off-farm income in this study was 16%, which was comparable to 
Isengilidina and Hudson’s (2001) result of 20%.  The summary statistics for all 
demographic variables and operation characteristics in this study match either generally 
accepted population data or data from previous cotton marketing studies.      
Regression Results 
The model was estimated with 262 observations, giving a pseudo R
2
 value of 
.6067, which indicates the overall model is a good fit.  Generally speaking, R
2
 is 
interpreted as the proportion of variation in the dependent variable that is explained by 
the set of independent variables.  This explanation is less sufficient for logit models, 
however, since the variation in the dependent variable is contained in a 0-1 interval.  For 
logit models, pseudo R2 is used, which elicits the proportion of variation explained in 
the full model (with all independent variables) to a model with an intercept term only 
(no independent variables).  Procedurally, this is performed by dividing the log-
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likelihood ratio of the full model by that of a model with all independent variables 
restricted out: 
           
               
             
 (13) 
Using seasonal cooperative pools as the base, the multinomial logit parameter estimates 
and marginal effects coefficients are shown in appendix B. 
Log-likelihood Coefficients 
The strongest predictor of cooperative pool usage was historical usage.  
Producers whose primary choice from 2004-2009 was cooperative pools were highly 
unlikely to adopt forward contracting in 2010.  Historical co-op usage was not 
significant in predicting cash market or merchant pool usage over co-op usage in 2010.  
This is not surprising given the similarities between seasonal co-op and merchant pools.  
Another interesting result was that producers’ self-characterization of co-op dividend 
importance in their marketing decisions was not significant when historical co-op usage 
was included in the regression.  This lines up with anecdotal evidence that dividends are 
less influential after the price spike of 2010-11.  A handful of respondents wrote in the 
“comments” section of the survey that they perceived mismanagement of both co-op 
and merchant pools in 2010. 
PHPBLF was directly related to choosing forward contracting over co-ops and 
significant at the alpha = .05 level.  This is somewhat contrary to Isengildina and 
Hudson’s (2001) result in which producers stated that a marketing pool could get them a 
higher price than they could get marketing on their own.  The result is interesting 
because it demonstrates a possible change in attitude towards the co-ops ability to 
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maximize welfare.  Presumably, producers were more apt to market their own cotton 
after the price spike of 2010-11.  Three other possible reasons are:  (1) the sign could 
represent a long-standing “defeatist” attitude by co-op customers that pre-harvest 
pricing isn’t truly possible or effective; or (2) producers who have a history of 
contracting with a merchant have simply done well enough times to reflect a higher 
PHPBLF value; or (3) co-op customers do believe in the effectiveness of forward 
pricing of some kind, but simply believe that co-op pooling is best way to capitalize on 
opportunities. 
WILLING was a significant predictor of choosing merchant spot cash sales over 
co-op marketing.  It was inversely related to marketing through co-op pools.  Producers 
willing to accept a lower price to reduce price risk would be less likely to sell on the 
harvest-time cash market (β = -1.21, z = -2.50).  Along the same lines, producers who 
consider themselves more willing to accept risk than their peers are significantly more 
likely to choose post-harvest cash sales over co-ops.  Both of these results confirmed 
Isengildina and Hudson’s (2001) findings.  In their study, producers who believed that 
pools netted them a higher price than “marketing on their own” were less likely to adopt 
cash sales as a marketing choice, and more likely to adopt cash sales if they were more 
willing to accept risk related to other producers.  Interestingly, WILLING elicited a 
result contrary to the conclusion drawn by Vergara et al (2004).  Their study revealed 
that, at the time, less risk-averse producers were more likely to adopt co-op marketing.  
The change in relationship between risk aversion and preference for co-op marketing 
may be due to the change in expectations of co-op pool performance in light of the more 
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recent high prices and high volatility.  It might also be the case that, since this study was 
heavily focused on Texas, more risk-averse producers are less prone to adopting 
forward contracting with merchants because of higher yield variability when compared 
to other regions of the country such as the Southeast. 
Yield variability was not a significant predictor of any specific marketing 
technique in the Vergara et al (2004) study.  This thesis includes the variable IRR in its 
analysis which is, theoretically, inversely related to yield variability.  A higher 
percentage of total acreage dedicated to irrigated production would lead to lower yield 
variability.  The coefficient on IRR for choosing forward contracting over co-op 
marketing is negative and statistically significant at the α = .05 level (β = -0.002, z = -
2.50).  This is a somewhat puzzling result because it was hypothesized that greater yield 
variability would have an inverse relationship with the probability of adopting merchant 
forward contracting over cooperative pooling.  One possibility is that the full effect of 
yield risk on the landscape of marketing alternatives was not felt until the record 
drought of the 2011 season.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that acreage contracts were 
readily available prior to 2011, but were ceased to be offered in Texas almost entirely in 
2012, with the merchants opting instead for direct bales basis contracts (Bynum 2012). 
Finally, producers who preferred forward contracting to co-op marketing 
believed that merchant pools give a higher price than co-ops (MPBLF).  The regression 
coefficient of MPBLF on Γ1 was 1.17 with a z-score of 2.18.  Why this variable was 
significant in choosing forward contracting and not in choosing merchant pools over co-
op pools is an interesting result.  One possible explanation lies in how respondents 
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reported which merchant or merchant pool they contracted with.  There are many 
merchants that offer both direct forward contracts and pooling.  In some cases, 
respondents reported contracting with a specific merchant pool, but indicated their 
primary 2010 choice was direct forward contracting.  This indicates there was likely 
some confusion as to how respondents’ general marketing choice and relationship with 
a specific merchant were to be reported.  A second possible explanation involves the 
relatively small number of producers reporting merchant pools as their primary choice 
(19 out of 263 responses).  In addition to MPBLF, EDUC and OFFINC were uniquely 
significant predictors of merchant pool contracting.  This suggests that some 
coefficients on MPOOL could be biased.  A possibly remedy would be to collapse 
MPOOL into other types of forward pricing.  MPOOL could be collapsed into COOP, 
per the similarities between co-op pools and merchant pools. Alternatively, MPOOL 
could be collapsed into FORWARD for two different justifications:  (1) many 
merchants offer both forward contracting and pooling, and (2) merchant customers in 
general might tend to believe merchant pools are better than cooperative pools per their 
affiliation with merchants, even though they forward contract.  Further research may be 
warranted to explore the possible complementary or substitutionary relationships 
between similar types of forward pricing. 
Marginal Effects Coefficients 
In terms of the marginal probability of adoption at the independent variable 
means (as derived from the log-likelihood functions in Equation 8), some interesting 
results are revealed.  While the log-likelihood regression coefficient on CDIV for CASH 
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was not significant, producers believing that co-op dividends were not influential in 
their choice of marketing arrangement were 6.41% more likely to choose cash sales 
over co-op marketing.  The marginal effect carried a z-score of -3.94.  Confirming the 
log-likelihood coefficient for WILLING on CASH, producers were 5.28% less likely to 
choose cash selling over co-ops if they were willing to accept a lower price to reduce 
risk (z = -2.86).  Producers who viewed price risk as a source of revenue risk were 6.8% 
(z = -2.89) less likely to adopt cash sales over co-op pooling.  Producers who said they 
were more willing to accept risk than other farmers were 5.87% (z = 3.03) more likely 
to adopt cash sales over co-op pooling.  Another economically intuitive result was that 
producers who believed pre-harvest pricing led to higher prices received relative to 
other methods (PHPBLF) were 6.3% (z = 2.52) more likely to adopt forward contracting 
over co-op pooling.  In terms of insurance choices, respondents were 7.77% more likely 
to adopt CASH over COOP at the mean value of MPCI (z = 2.06). 
While the marginal effects coefficients are more conducive to interpretation than 
the log-likelihood coefficients, they are open to problems.  Mainly, the coefficients only 
represent the variable’s contribution to the marginal probability of adoption at their 
means.  As a variable value moves away from the mean and towards the endpoint, the 
marginal effect on the probability of adoption at that point may be greater or lesser than 
at the mean.  For example, at very high levels of ACRES, additional acres may have 
very little effect on the probability of adopting FORWARD over COOP, whereas at the 
mean of ACRES, a larger farm might be significantly more likely to forward contract. 
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Another important interpretation consideration with the marginal effects is the 
scale of the independent variables.  Returning to the same ACRES example, the 
marginal effect of ACRES on MPOOL (the probability of adopting MPOOL over 
COOP) at the mean is only 0.003%, but the coefficient is statistically significant at the α 
= .05 level.  Such a result may seem trivial, but it is necessary to consider the scale:  the 
increase in farm size of one acre at the mean leads to an increase in the marginal 
probability of adopting MPOOL over COOP of 0.003%.  Given that the mean of 
ACRES is 1,032 with a standard deviation of 1,122, a minimum of 16 and a maximum 
of 9,000, this result should not be ignored.    
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 The findings presented in this thesis have various implications for producers, 
merchants, pool managers, policy makers and academia.  The remainder of this thesis 
will be devoted to discussing these implications and providing a launching point for 
future research endeavors. 
Implications for the Cotton Industry 
 Cotton industry professionals on both sides of the marketing apparatus may find 
the results presented in this thesis interesting.  Every season, producers are faced with 
the question of how to maximize welfare by choosing the marketing outlet—or 
combination of outlets—with the best risk-balancing capability.  Producers want to 
minimize risk but are also concerned with the ever-present question of which marketing 
arrangement will net them the highest price.  As presented in the summary statistics, 
producers who cash contracted in 2010 wound up receiving the highest average price for 
their crop, but it is necessary to reinforce the idea that prices vary randomly—especially 
considering that successive price increases happened throughout the Southwestern 
harvest and shortly thereafter, which is normally a point in the season where prices are 
low due to the acute increase in supply after harvest.  This thesis lines up with previous 
literature on producer marketing in that it finds no evidence contradictory to the 
efficient market hypothesis.  The fact that a shifting of marketing preferences has 
occurred between the cotton marketing studies of the early 2000s and 2010—and likely 
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occurred between 2010 and 2011—speaks to the idea that markets cannot be timed.  
Producers, then, are best advised to continue to diversify marketing arrangements to 
diffuse risk, and to use the marketing outlets and hedging tools that work best with their 
respective crop insurance choices (program types and coverage levels), yield history, 
cash reserves and financial risk.  Producers should consider the complimentary and 
substitutionary relationships between insurance, loan programs, cash marketing outlets 
and hedging mentioned in this thesis to minimize overlap between risk-management 
strategies and redundant costs. 
  On the other side of the marketing apparatus, pool managers and merchants may 
find a few particular results from this thesis helpful in understanding the producers they 
buy from.  One of these noteworthy results lies in the apparent change in attitude among 
producers towards cooperative pool pricing objectives since the Vergara et al (2004) 
study.  Their findings suggested that the typical co-op pool customer at the time was 
less-risk averse compared to other producers, presumably because a seasonal pool does 
not offer the same price guarantee as a forward contract with a merchant.  This thesis 
found the opposite result.  Such a finding lines up with anecdotal evidence that suggests 
that cooperative pools have come to be viewed as the “status quo,” whereas other 
marketing alternatives are perceived as being more aggressive.  This is not entirely 
surprising given the producer cognizance of seasonal pools failing to capture the upside 
price movement in late 2010.  In light of this, pool managers may need to reassess their 
own selling and pricing strategies and ensure that the resulting changes to their 
strategies are being effectively communicated to producers in order to instill confidence 
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that the pools are truly working to maximize producer welfare.  Moreover, it appears 
that dividends and book credits are not as influential as one would think; thus, public 
relations efforts toward producers should be aimed more at improving the perception of 
actual pool performance—especially over long periods of time—instead of the benefits 
of co-op ownership. 
 The marginal effects coefficients enumerated on p. 40 have a unique application 
for pool managers.  Pool managers may want to target producers with characteristics 
that are directly related to adoption of the pools the managers represent, such as the 
effect of PRRISK on COOP.  Conversely, pool managers may not find it worth their 
efforts to market their services to producers with characteristics that are inversely 
related to the adoption of merchant or cooperative pools, such as the effect of 
ATTITUDE on COOP.  
 Merchants may find value in the result that indicates a significant, direct 
relationship between the opinion that merchant pools pay a higher price than co-op 
pools and the probability of adopting both forward contracting and merchant pool 
contracting over co-op pools.  While somewhat obvious, this result is important in that 
there was agreement across the board on this question among all merchant customers 
regardless of whether they were in a pool or had a direct contract.  It may be prudent for 
merchants to develop new pools, pool together with other merchants or increase their 
efforts to induce producers into existing pools.  This would capitalize on the attitude 
among merchant customers that merchant pooling is superior while reducing the yield 
risk exposure inherent in direct forward contracting. 
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Implications for Public Policy 
 Facing the prospect of direct payments and counter-cyclical payments being 
phased out of the cotton program entirely in the 2012 farm bill, it is imperative to come 
to a better understanding of the various market-based risk-management strategies and 
how they interact with one another.  Since no coefficients on the 0/1 indicator variables 
for insurance were statistically significant, it is difficult to ascertain producer knowledge 
level of these interactions.  The agricultural economics literature documents evidence of 
redundance in the marketing and hedging strategies of producers and their insurance 
choices, and this thesis produced no results that indicate producers have a better 
understanding of these interactions.  More education at extension workshops on the 
complimentary or substitutionary effects between insurance and hedging may be 
warranted.   
An alternative policy consideration is to shift subsidies from insurance programs 
to helping producers with the cost of direct hedging.  Subsidies could be used to help 
producers post margin on futures contracts or pay option premiums.  In such a program, 
market price movements would trigger smaller payments throughout the year, rather 
than a large volume of indemnities being paid out at harvest.  Analysis may be needed 
to determine if these smaller payments would accomplish similar results as insurance 
for a lower cost to society.      
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Future Research 
Logit Analysis of Insurance Choices 
 Tying in with the previous paragraph, further analysis on insurance choices may 
be warranted given the changing policy environment.  An initial analysis could be 
conducted with the data set used for this thesis.  Logistic regression could be used to 
model the factors leading to the insurance choices of producers in this study.  A binary 
logit estimation could be performed with the two variables RI and MPCI.  Alternatively, 
multinomial logit or tobit could be employed to allow for the possibility of no insurance 
purchase.  Such a study might help shed light on producers’ use of insurance in 
conjunction with their cash marketing choices, hedging decisions, operator and 
operation characteristics and risk attitudes. 
Hedging Revisited 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, hedging was included as an explanatory variable in 
this analysis because of its function as a substitute for insurance and government 
commodity programs and its ability to be used independently of other marketing 
arrangements.  Estimation of a hedging model with hedging as a dependent variable 
may be warranted.  This is necessary both for the cause of updating the literature on 
hedging given the new market conditions mentioned in this thesis, and for new 
explanations and considerations of hedging behavior.  In addition to merely modeling 
the decision of whether or not to hedge, a possible interesting analysis would be to elicit 
the factors determining whether or not a producer who hedged matched his/her futures 
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or options contracts with other forward pricing methods.  Hedging may be viewed not 
just to reduce risk, but to maximize returns to marketing. 
Demand Systems Approach to Modeling Producer Marketing Decisions 
The multinomial logit framework allowed for comparison with prior studies.  
However, since the survey measured shares of production allocated to alternative 
marketing outlets, more information can be brought to bear.  This suggests the 
possibility of a demand system framework such as the seemingly unrelated regression 
approach employed by Isengildina and Hudson (2001b).  Such a model could be built on 
the classical assumption that demand for a good (in this case, a marketing outlet, which 
would be seen as a service available to a grower they can use to maximize returns to 
marketing) is a function of its own price, the price of substitutes and compliments and 
income.  The cost of information about a marketing outlet X could be likened to own-
price.  The transaction costs associated with and cost of information about alternative 
risk management strategies (insurance, hedging, etc) could be likened to cross-prices.  
Producers’ availability of human capital and access to cash and credit reserves could be 
likened to income. A possible functional form is as follows: 
                                                                        
Where transaction costs include commission on futures and options trades, the 
opportunity cost of funds posted for margin calls, options premiums and crop insurance 
premiums. 
The results from a demand system specification might differ from the results of 
the primary choice model employed in this thesis.  Some producers in the data set 
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indicated marketing a significant portion of their crop through secondary and, in some 
cases, tertiary outlets.  Diversification of marketing outlets might have a risk-balancing 
effect that makes it harder to distinguish between producers with different risk attitude 
and perception characteristics.  Different marketing outlets might also prove to be 
complimentary to one another in some cases.  For example, pool pricing may be 
complimentary to forward contracting for a producer attempting to balance the risk 
inherent in average pricing with the certainty of pre-harvest pricing.  In contrast, certain 
independent variables might exhibit more explanatory power if information about 
secondary marketing choices is preserved.  An example of this effect would be a 
producer who markets their crop through two related outlets, such as forward 
contracting and pool contracting with the same merchant due to their affiliation with the 
merchant and desire to compliment pre-harvest pricing with average pricing.  Survey 
questions that were not included in the logit specification such as, “my local merchant 
representative is more important to me than the parent company in deciding which 
merchant I will contract with,” may prove influential in predicting a producer’s 
marketing strategy.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Summary Statistics of 2012 Survey of Southwestern Cotton Marketing Choices
3
 
 
Variable Description Mean STDDEV Minimum Maximum 
COOP 0/1 indicator of primary 
co-op pool choice 
0.639 0.481 0 1 
FORWARD 0/1 indicator of primary 
merchant forward 
contracting choice 
0.156 0.363 0 1 
CASH 0/1 indicator of primary 
merchant spot market 
choice 
0.113 0.340 0 1 
MPOOL 0/1 indicator of primary 
merchant pool choice 
0.072 0.259 0 1 
CHIST 0/1 indicator of historical 
marketing with co-op 
pool 
0.55 0.498 0 1 
CDIV 5-pt scale of influence of 
co-op dividends and book 
credits (5=more 
influential) 
3.247 1.147 1 5 
HEDGED 0/1 indicator of 2010 
hedging 
0.057 0.232 0 1 
MPCI 0/1 indicator of 2010 
purchase of multi-peril 
crop insurance 
0.414 0.494 0 1 
RI 0/1 indicator of 2010 
purchase of revenue 
insurance 
0.525 0.515 0 1 
PHPBLF 5-pt scale belief about 
pre-harvest pricing and 
higher prices (5=strongly 
agree) 
3.414 0.833 1 5 
  
                                                          
3
 See table 1 in the text for a list of variable names and definitions. 
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WILLING 5-pt scale of willingness 
to take a lower price to 
reduce price risk (5=more 
willing) 
3.095 0.888 1 5 
CPBLF 5-pt scale belief that co-
op pool marketing gives 
average prices 
(5=strongly agree) 
3.650 0.886 1 5 
MPBLF 5-pt scale belief that 
merchant pools give 
higher price than co-op 
(5=strongly agree) 
2.795 0.769 1 5 
PRRISK 5-pt scale view of price 
risk as source of revenue 
risk (5=high potential 
effect) 
4.338 0.707 2 5 
ATTITUDE 5-pt scale comparison to 
other farmers’ willingness 
to accept risk (5=much 
more willing) 
3.243 0.857 1 5 
OFFINC Percent of household 
income from off-farm 
sources 
16.0% 23.9% 0% 100% 
ASSETS Total market value of 
assets in farming 
operation (1=<$100K, 
2=$100K--$499K, 
3=$500K--$999K, 
4=$1M--$1.99M, 
5=$2M-$4.99M, 
6=>$5M) 
2.592 1.300 0 5 
LEVERAGE Percent of total dollars 
invested in operation that 
are borrowed 
35.4% 32.6% 0% 100% 
AGE Respondent age in years 57.802 13.671 25 98 
EDU Respondent education 
level (0=<HS, 1=HS or 
GED, 2=some college, 
3=4-yr degree, 4=grad 
school 
2.430 0.993 0 4 
ACRES Size variable (2010 total 
cotton acres planted) 
1,032 1,132 16 9,000 
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IRR Total 2010 planted cotton 
acres that were irrigated 
332.4 528.3 0 4,000 
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APPENDIX B 
Log-likelihood Coefficients and Marginal Effects 
 
 
FORWARD CASH MPOOL 
 
Log Marginal Log Marginal Log Marginal 
CHIST 
-6.46* 0.5424 -20.789 -0.704 -20.708 -0.507 
-4.93 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
CDIV 
-0.529 0.0198 -1.610* -0.064* -0.766 -0.001 
-1.49 1.05 -3.63 -3.94 -1.73 -0.09 
HEDGED 
-0.511 0.5170 -2.812** 0.113 -20.213 -0.852 
-0.49 0.01 -1.76 0 -0.01 -0.01 
MPCI 
-0.388 -0.0333 1.029 0.078* -0.946 -0.046 
-0.45 -0.71 1.11 2.06 -0.87 -1.26 
RI 
-0.621 -0.0437 0.686 0.064 -0.883 -0.033 
-0.76 -0.97 0.79 1.79 -0.91 -1.01 
PHPBLF 
0.967* 0.0632* 0.181 -0.018 0.225 -0.015 
2.13 2.52 0.4 -0.95 0.4 -0.77 
WILLING 
-0.358 0.0109 -1.209* -0.053* -0.286 0.011 
-0.91 0.52 -2.5 -2.86 -0.56 0.64 
CPBLF 
-0.804** -0.0373 -0.517 -0.002 -0.425 0.007 
-1.78 -1.64 -1.09 -0.12 -0.79 0.39 
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MPBLF 
1.18* 0.0545** 0.000 -0.049** 1.457* 0.037 
2.18 1.89 0 -1.76 2.04 1.53 
PRRISK 
0.661 0.0379 -0.658 -0.068* 1.221 0.047* 
1.19 1.29 -1.09 -2.89 1.71 1.96 
ATTITUDE 
0.485 -0.0080 1.396* 0.059* 0.364 -0.013 
1.07 -0.34 2.68 3.03 0.63 -0.67 
OFFINC 
0.024 0.0014 -0.023 -0.002* 0.044 0.002* 
1.51 1.61 -1.19 -3.24 2.1 2.51 
ASSETS 
-0.033 0.0133 -0.229 -0.006 -0.414 -0.015 
-0.12 0.85 -0.72 -0.5 -1.09 -1.14 
LEVERAGE 
0.009 0.0009 -0.012 -0.001 0.006 0.000 
0.73 1.31 -0.83 -1.66 0.38 0.37 
AGE 
0.022 0.0005 -0.014 -0.002 0.067 0.003** 
0.87 0.29 -0.44 -1.5 1.9 1.92 
EDUC 
-0.25 0.0172 -0.526 -0.010 -0.95** -0.029 
-0.61 0.82 -1.12 -0.53 -1.9 -1.93 
ACRES 
0.0004 0.0000 -0.0005 0.000* 0.001* 0.00003* 
1.20 1.5 -1.23 -2.84 2.09 2.93 
IRR 
-0.002* -0.0002* -0.0002 0.000 0.000 0.00005** 
-2.50 -3.06 -0.18 1.22 -0.05 1.79 
 
*Denotes coefficient that is statistically significant at the alpha = .05 level  , while ** implies significance at 
alpha = .10 level.  (z-statistics are in italics) 
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Variance-Covariance Matrix of Independent Variables 
 
 
 
 
